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Abstract
We examine the relation between optimal venture capital contracts and the supply and
demand for venture capital. Both the composition and type of financial claims held by the
venture capitalist and entrepreneur depend on the market structure. Beside, diﬀerent market
structures involve diﬀerent optimal forms of transferring utility: sometimes it is optimal to
transfer utility via equity stakes, sometimes it is optimal to use debt. Transferring utility via
equity stakes aﬀects incentives. Consequently, the net value created, the success probability, the
market value, and the performance of venture-capital backed investments depend on the supply
and demand for capital. Similarly, venture capitalists face diﬀerent incentives to screen projects
if the capital supply is low or high. We then endogenize the capital supply and study the relation
between venture capital contracts and entry costs, public policy, investment profitability, and
market transparency. Finally, we show that entry by inexperienced investors creates a negative
externality for the value creation in ventures financed by (regular) venture capitalists.
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1 Introduction
Do optimal financial contracts depend on the supply and demand for capital? And if so, how?
In this paper, we address this question in the context of venture capital contracting. We exam-
ine whether, and how, optimal venture capital contracts vary with the supply and demand for
capital, or more generally, the level of competition in the venture capital market. Pursuing this
question within the traditional financial contracting framework is problematic, as it assumes
that one side (typically the entrepreneur) has all the market power. We hence depart from the
traditional paradigm and embed venture capital contracting in a search market where entrepre-
neurs and venture capitalists bargain over optimal contracts. Both the supply and demand for
capital are competitive in the sense that there are many venture capitalists and many entrepre-
neurs. The market power of each side is determined by the ratio of supply to demand. A high
ratio implies that the degree of competition among venture capitalists is high.
We find that both the composition and type of financial claims held by the venture capitalist
and entrepreneur depend on the market structure, or degree of competition. If the degree
of competition is either low or high, one side holds a mix of debt and equity and the other
side holds straight equity. If the degree of competition is intermediate, both sides hold debt
and equity. Generally, a change in the ratio of supply to demand aﬀects market powers and
therefore the distribution of surplus. The question is whether utility should be transferred via
equity or debt. As a guiding principle, utility should be transferred at least cost, i.e., in a way
that minimizes incentive distortions. We show that diﬀerent competition levels entail diﬀerent
optimal forms of transferring utility. If the level of competition is either low or high, utility is
transferred by changing the equity component of the optimal contract. If the level of competition
is intermediate, utility is transferred by changing the debt component.
Work by Lerner (1995), Hellmann and Puri (2001), and Kaplan and Strömberg (2001b)
indicates that venture capital contracting may be appropriately viewed as a double-sided moral-
hazard problem.1 Venture capitalists monitor the progress of the firm, give advice, provide
entrepreneurs with access to consultants, investment bankers, and lawyers, negotiate with sup-
pliers, and play an active role in the building up of human resources and recruiting of senior
management. Under double-sided moral hazard, the second-best solution requires that both
the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur hold suﬃciently large equity stakes. Actual equity
stakes, however, are determined by bargaining, where outside options depend on the level of
competition in the capital market. For low and high levels of competition, outside options are
strongly asymmetric, which implies that equity stakes , and hence incentives, deviate from the
1 Theoretical papers modelling venture capital contracting as a double-sided moral-hazard problem include
Casamatta (2000), Cestone (2001), Renucci (2000), Repullo and Suarez (2000), and Schmidt (2000).
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second-best optimum. (While riskless debt can be used to transfer utility without aﬀecting
incentives, the total amount of riskless debt available is limited.)
This has the following additional implications: the net value created in ventures is a hump-
shaped function of the degree of competition. If eﬀorts are substitutes, the success probability,
the market value, and the average performance of venture-capital backed investments are in-
creasing in the degree of competition if the entrepreneur’s contribution is more important, and
decreasing if the venture capitalist’s contribution is more important. If eﬀorts are complements,
the success probability, market value, and average performance are all hump-shaped functions
of the degree of competition. Most of our results remain yet to be tested. The ones that have
been tested, however, are consistent with the empirical evidence. We provide a discussion of the
empirical evidence at the end of this paper.
In an extension of the model, we consider projects (or entrepreneurs) of low and high quality.
Prior to making his investment, the venture capitalist can screen the project. We show that
venture capitalists screen more if the degree of competition is low, and less if the degree of
competition is high.
A caveat is in order here. The above implications are based on the notion that financial
claims have a first-order eﬀect on incentives. While it is diﬃcult to say what motivates venture
capitalists in practice, the following quote suggests that financial claims matter.2
In an investment memo regarding a company in the financial information industry,
a venture capitalist outlines a number of actions that he will undertake to assist
the company. Among the risk factors which the venture capitalist worries about is
whether he “can [...] get enough money at work, or ownership in the company, to
warrant allocating these extra resources.”
Similarly, Kaplan and Strömberg (2001b) conclude that equity incentives increase the likelihood
that venture capitalists perform value-added support activities.
In the second part of the paper, we take the argument one step further and examine factors
that potentially aﬀect the capital supply. We consider entry costs, public policy, investment
profitability, and market transparency. To investigate the role of these factors, we endogenize
the entry decision of venture capitalists, thereby endogenizing the degree of competition in the
capital market. An individual venture capitalist entering the market does not take into account
the eﬀect of his entry on the overall level of competition, and thus on the bargaining, contracting,
and value creation in other ventures. Depending on the level of competition prevailing in the
market, entry by an individual venture capitalist thus either creates a positive or negative
contracting externality.
2 We thank Per Strömberg for this quote.
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It is frequently argued that the short-run supply of informed capital is fixed, for it takes time
to develop the skills and experience which are necessary to be a good advisor (Gompers and
Lerner 1999). In an extension of the model, we assume that informed capital is in short supply.
There is, however, an abundant potential supply of portfolio investors, i.e., investors who have
capital but no expertise.3 We show that if the level of competition is strong, portfolio investors
not only fail to add value in their own ventures, but also create a negative externality for the
value added in ventures financed by (regular) venture capitalists.
We believe our model of bargaining and search captures important features of real-world
venture capital contracting environments. In our model, deals are struck through bilateral nego-
tiations, and not through auctions or a Walrasian tâtonnement mechanism. Both entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists must actively look for deals. They can quit negotiations at any time and
team up with somebody else. Finding a suitable partner takes time, however, and is easier the
greater the supply of potential partners relative to the demand. Everyone is aware of his own
and his partner’s outside options, and this aﬀects the outcome of the negotiations.4 Finally,
search models have appealing economic properties. For instance, in our model outside options,
and hence contracts, adjust gradually to changes in the degree of competition. By contrast, in
a Walrasian market the outcome is a bang-bang solution where the shorter side of the market
has the entire market power. This can have extreme implications: if there are K venture capi-
talists and K− 1 entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs have the entire market power. If there are K + 1
entrepreneurs, however, venture capitalists have the entire market power.
By embedding venture capital contracting in a market environment, our paper goes beyond
papers studying venture capital contracting in isolation. On the other hand, unlike many of
these papers, our simple model falls short of explaining the richness of cash flow and control
rights found in real-world venture capital contracts Michelacci and Suarez (2000) also have
a search-based model of start-up financing. Unlike our model, Michelacci and Suarez do not
consider incentive contracts or contracting ineﬃciencies. Instead, they consider search ineﬃcien-
cies, using an insight from the search literature that entry creates externalities for the matching
chances of other market participants. In Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2000), the limited partners
3 There is evidence of inexperienced investors entering the venture capital industry at times when the market is
“hot”. For instance, the Economist notes: “[a] host of new entrants are now dabbling in venture capital, ranging
from ad hoc groups of MBAs to blue-blooded investment banks such as J.P. Morgan, to sports stars and even the
CIA.” Money to Burn, the Economist, May 27, 2000.
4 Entrepreneurs typically strike better deals when the supply of capital is abundant. The following is a statement
comparing the boom period of the most recent venture capital cycle with the aftermath: “if you went into a [...]
start-up three to six months ago, you almost certainly got a very bad deal. Companies could ask for anything
they wanted [in terms of valuation]. Now entrepreneurs are much more realistic.” Open Season for Europe’s
Turkeys, Financial Times, January 11, 2001.
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in a venture partnership (i.e., the investors) must incentivize the venture capitalist to monitor
an entrepreneur. Changes in the market environment that close the gap between the venture
capitalist’s private opportunity cost of capital and the investors’ cost of capital improve the
eﬃciency of the incentive contract. Inderst (2001) also examines the relationship between com-
petition and contract design. Unlike this paper, he considers screening contracts in an adverse
selection setting. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to investigate the relation between in-
centive contracts and market structure in a moral hazard setting. Finally, we are not the first to
note that constraints on transfer payments may impair contract eﬃciency. Aghion and Bolton
(1992) and Legros and Newman (2000) both discuss the implications of this for the optimal
allocation of control rights.
2 Non-Technical Overview
Section 3 presents the model. The model consists of three building blocks: i) financial con-
tracting, ii) bargaining, and iii) search. Section 3.1 studies a contracting problem between an
entrepreneur and a venture capitalist. The optimal contract is a combination of equity and risk-
less debt.5 Both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist can exert eﬀort. Equilibrium eﬀort
levels depend on the way in which the equity is allocated between the two. We first derive the
utility possibility frontier generated by diﬀerent equity allocations. The undominated segment
of the frontier is called equity frontier. We subsequently add the riskless debt. The idea is to
allocate the debt in a way that minimizes incentive distortions. The utility possibility frontier
generated by diﬀerent Pareto-optimal contracts is called bargaining frontier. In Section 3.2, the
entrepreneur and venture capitalist bargain over an optimal contract. We apply the generalized
Nash bargaining solution. Reservation values, i.e., outside options, are exogenous. In Section
3.3, we endogenize reservation values by embedding the bargaining problem in a search market
with pairwise matching. Reservation values are determined by the market structure, or degree
of competition, as expressed by the ratio of venture capitalists to entrepreneurs in the market.
The degree of competition is assumed to be exogenous.
Section 4 summarizes the results. Via its eﬀect on reservation values, the degree of compe-
tition determines i) the optimal financial contract, ii) the net value created, i.e., the expected
project return minus aggregate eﬀort costs, iii) the gross surplus, which corresponds to the
market (or IPO) value of the venture if it was sold after eﬀort and investment costs are sunk
but before returns are realized, iv) the expected, or average, performance of the venture-backed
5 An alternative interpretation is that the entrepreneur and venture capitalist hold combinations of common
and straight preferred stock, or, with minor qualifications, participating convertible preferred stock. Such claims
are widely used in real-world venture capital contracts (Kaplan and Strömberg 2001a).
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investment, and v) the success probability of the venture, i.e., the likelihood that the investment
pays oﬀ more than it costs. We also study the role of up-front payments.
Section 5 endogenizes the degree of competition by introducing free entry of capital. We
examine the way in which the degree of competition, and thus the optimal contract, net value,
etc., is aﬀected by i) entry costs, ii) regulation and public policy, iii) investment profitability,
and iv) market transparency.
Section 6 considers projects of diﬀerent quality. We investigate the impact of competition
on the incentives of venture capitalists to screen projects ex ante.
Section 7 introduces a second class of investors: portfolio investors, i.e., investors who have
money but no skills. We examine the eﬀect of entry by portfolio investors on the performance
of investments financed by (regular) venture capitalists.
Section 8 concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
3 The Basic Model
3.1 Financial Contracting
The Basic Setup
A penniless entrepreneur has a project which requires an investment outlay I > 0. Funding
is provided by a venture capitalist. The project return is Xl ≥ 0 with probability 1 − p and
Xh > I > Xl with probability p. The success probability p = p (e, a) depends on both the entre-
preneur’s and the venture capitalist’s (unobservable) eﬀorts e ∈ [0, 1] and a ∈ [0, 1], respectively.
The corresponding eﬀort cost functions are cE (e) := e2/2αE and cF (a) := a2/2α. All agents
are risk neutral.
The project return can be decomposed into a riskless return equal to Xl and a risky return
paying 0 in the bad state and∆X := Xh−Xl in the good state. With the usual degree of caution,
we refer to these as debt and equity. An optimal contract between the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist specifies i) the venture capitalist’s investment I, ii) the debt 0 ≤ S ≤ Xl held by
the venture capitalist, and iii) the fraction of equity s ∈ [0, 1] held by the venture capitalist.6 In
Section 4, we additionally admit up-front payments by the venture capitalist. The entrepreneur
keeps any return not paid to the venture capitalist. The entrepreneur’s utility from the contract
(s, S) is U (s, S) := u (s) + Xl − S, where u (s) := p (1 − s)∆X − e2/2αE represents his utility
from the equity allocation s. Likewise, the venture capitalist’s utility from the contract (s, S)
is V (s, S) := v (s) + S − I, where v (s) := ps∆X − a2/2α represents his utility from the equity
allocation s.
6 This rules out that one party receives a higher payment in the bad state than in the good state. It is easy to
show that such contracts are never optimal.
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To simplify the exposition, we proceed in two steps. We first derive the set of Pareto-
optimal u− v combinations. The utility possibility frontier generated by Pareto-optimal equity
allocations is called equity frontier. We then add the riskless debt and investment cost and
derive the set of Pareto-optimal U − V combinations. The utility possibility frontier generated
by Pareto-optimal contracts is called bargaining frontier.
The Equity Frontier
The equity frontier u = ψE (v) depicts the utilities u (s) and v (s) for all Pareto-optimal
equity allocations. In general, the precise shape of the equity frontier depends on the production
technology p (e, a) . There are, however, some robust properties that any well-behaved equity
frontier has. These are:
i) the equity frontier is strictly concave,
ii) the sum u (s) + v (s) attains its maximum in the interior of the domain, and
iii) along the equity frontier, v (s) is strictly increasing in s.
The first two properties follow naturally from the fact that the incentive problem is two-sided and
eﬀort costs are strictly convex. Maximizing the sum of utilities then requires balancing the two
incentive problems. Giving one side too big an equity stake is ineﬃcient as it will then produce
at a point where the marginal eﬀort cost is relatively high. Accordingly, the equity allocation
maximizing the total utility lies somewhere in the interior. Denote the point where the total
utility is maximized by (vˆ, uˆ), and the corresponding equity allocation by sˆ. We occasionally
refer to this as the joint-surplus maximizing, or second-best, solution. Clearly, ψ0E (vˆ) = −1.
The third property states that the venture capitalist’s utility increases with his equity stake.
Note that this need not be true for dominated segments of the utility possibility frontier, i.e.,
segments that lie not on the equity frontier. (See the following examples.)
We illustrate these properties by means of two examples. The first is based on the linear
technology p (e, a) = da + (1 − d) e used in, e.g., Casamatta (2000). The second is based on
the Cobb-Douglas technology p (e, a) = ade1−d used in, e.g., Repullo and Suarez (2000). Under
the linear technology, the two eﬀorts are substitutes while under the Cobb-Douglas technology,
they are complements. While for the remainder of the paper we could work with either of
these technologies (or any other well-behaved technology), we instead use the general notation
u = ψE (v) and assume that properties i)−iii) hold. To make the problem non-trivial, we assume
that the second-best outcome is suﬃciently good to allow the venture capitalist to break even,
i.e., that vˆ > I.
Example 1: Linear Technology. To ensure that the equilibrium success probability
has an interior solution, we assume that max {αE (1 − d) ,αFd} < 1/∆X . Given some equity
allocation s, the corresponding equilibrium eﬀort choices are a∗(s) = αFds∆X and e∗(s) =
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αE (1 − d) (1 − s)∆X , respectively. The equilibrium success probability is
p∗(s) := p(e∗(s), a∗(s)) = ∆X
h
αFd
2s + αE (1 − d)2 (1 − s)
i
. (1)
The venture capitalist’s and entrepreneur’s utility from the equity allocation s is
v(s) =
1
2
αFd
2s2∆2X + αE (1 − d)2 s (1 − s)∆2X , (2)
and
u(s) =
1
2
αE (1 − d)2 (1 − s)2∆2X + α2Fd2s (1 − s)∆2X , (3)
respectively.
Figure 1: Equity Frontier for Linear Technology.
Figure 1 depicts the utility possibility frontier generated by diﬀerent equity allocations. By
increasing the venture capitalist’s equity share s from zero to one, we move along the curve
clockwise. In the picture, we assume that αE (1 − d)2 > αFd2, i.e., the entrepreneur is more
productive than the venture capitalist. If the reverse holds or if productivities are equal, the
picture looks similar. Appendix A discusses all cases.
The equity frontier is the undominated segment of the utility possibility frontier. It is defined
on the interval [v, v], where in this example v = v(0) = 0 and v = v(s), where s < 1. If s > s,
the utility of both parties decreases with s, which is due to the fact that the entrepreneur is
more productive. Hence, even if the venture capitalist had all the market power, he would want
to leave the entrepreneur some rent. (If the venture capitalist were more productive, the reverse
would hold.) A formal derivation of the equity frontier and a proof that properties i)−iii) hold
is provided in Appendix A.
Example 2: Cobb-Douglas Technology. To ensure that the equilibrium success
probability has an interior solution, we assume again that max {αE (1 − d) ,αFd} < 1/∆X .
Equilibrium eﬀort choices are then e∗(s) = (αE (1 − d) (1 − s)∆X [a∗(s)]d)
1
1+d and a∗(s) =
(αFds∆X [e
∗(s)]1−d)
1
2−d , implying that
p∗ (s) = ρ (s)∆X , (4)
where ρ (s) := [αFds]
d [αE(1 − d)(1 − s)]1−d . The venture capitalist’s and entrepreneur’s utility
from the equity allocation s is
v(s) =
1
2
(2 − d) s∆2Xρ (s) , (5)
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and
u(s) =
1
2
(1 + d) (1 − s)∆2Xρ (s) . (6)
respectively.
Figure 2: Equity Frontier for Cobb-Douglas Technology.
Figure 2 depicts the utility possibility and equity frontier for the Cobb-Douglas technology.
Since eﬀorts are complements, only a relatively small segment of the utility possibility frontier
is undominated. In Appendix A we show that properties i)-iii) again hold.
The Bargaining Frontier
The bargaining frontier depicts the utility of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist, U =
u (s) +Xl−S and V = v (s) +S−I, respectively, for all Pareto-optimal contracts. We construct
the bargaining frontier from the equity frontier by adding the riskless debt in a way that mini-
mizes incentive distortions. (Adding the investment cost is trivial as it is borne by the venture
capitalist.) The construction is simple. Suppose s > sˆ, in which case the venture capitalist holds
too much and the entrepreneur too little equity relative to the second-best. Any Pareto-optimal
contract where s > sˆ must also have S = Xl, i.e., the venture capitalist must hold the entire
debt. If not, a Pareto-improvement would be possible where the entrepreneur trades in debt for
equity, thereby getting closer to the second-best solution. Similarly, if s < sˆ, the entrepreneur
must hold the entire debt. If s = sˆ, any debt allocation is Pareto-optimal.
Figure 3: Construction of the Bargaining Frontier.
Figure 3 depicts the construction of the bargaining frontier. The figure is based on the equity
frontier in Figure 1. We therefore have v = 0, implying that max {v − I, 0} = 0. There are three
regions. In the left interval, the entrepreneur holds the entire debt and an ineﬃciently large
fraction of the equity. In the middle interval, both parties hold debt and equity. The equity
allocation is second-best optimal. As we move along the frontier clockwise, debt is shifted to
the venture capitalist until he holds all of it. As this is merely a wealth transfer, the slope of
the bargaining frontier in the middle interval is minus one. Finally, in the right interval, the
venture capitalist holds the entire debt and an ineﬃciently large fraction of the equity. This is
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The bargaining frontier takes the following form:
U = ψB(V ) :=

ψE(V + I) + Xl if V ∈ [max {v − I, 0} , vˆ − I]
ψE(vˆ) + [Xl − I + vˆ − V ] if V ∈ [vˆ − I, vˆ + Xl − I]
ψE(V −Xl + I) if V ∈ [vˆ + Xl − I, v + Xl − I]
. (7)
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3.2 Bargaining
It is reasonable to assume that when bargaining over a contract, the entrepreneur and venture
capitalist choose a contract that is Pareto-eﬃcient. Bargaining over a contract thus corresponds
to choosing a utility pair (V,U) on the bargaining frontier. Let UR and V R denote the entre-
preneur’s and venture capitalist’s reservation values, or outside options. For the moment we
assume that reservation values are exogenous. In the following section, we derive reservation
values endogenously as a function of the supply and demand in the capital market. We use
the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Accordingly, the entrepreneur and venture capitalist
select utilities U = ψB(V ) ≥ UR and V ≥ V R maximizing the Nash-product£
V − V R¤b £ψB(V ) − UR¤1−b , (8)
where b ∈ (0, 1) . For convenience, define β := b/ (1 − b).
As the bargaining frontier is strictly concave, the bargaining problem has a unique solution.
Denote this solution by
¡
V B, UB
¢
, where UB = ψB(V B). We can restrict attention to the
case where V B ∈ (max {v − I, 0} , v + Xl − I) , i.e., where the solution lies in the interior (see
Appendix B, Proof of Proposition 1). It then follows from the first-order condition that
β = −V
B − V R
UB −URψ
0
B(V
B), (9)
implying that V B is continuous and strictly increasing (decreasing) in V R (in UR).
As is well known, the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution can be derived as the limit of a
non-cooperative bargaining game where the two parties bargain with an open time horizon under
the risk of breakdown (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986). If β = 0.5, the two players
alternate in making proposals or are chosen with equal probability each period. If β 6= 0.5,
the players are chosen with unequal probabilities. Finally, it is worth noting that our results
do not depend on the specifics of the Nash bargaining solution. All we need for our results is
that an agent’s bargaining utility is positively related to his own and negatively related to his
counterparty’s outside option.
3.3 Search
We finally embed the bargaining problem in a market environment. We consider a stationary
search market populated by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The measure of entrepreneurs
and venture capitalists in the market is ME and MF , respectively. A key variable is the ratio of
venture capitalists to entrepreneurs, or degree of competition, MF /ME =: θ. A high value of θ
implies that the capital supply is highly competitive.
Time is continuous. Both sides discount future utilities at interest rate r > 0. From the
perspective of a venture capitalist, the arrival rate of a deal is given by a decreasing function
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q(θ), where limθ→0 q(θ) = ∞ and limθ→∞ q(θ) = 0. Hence a venture capitalist is more likely to
meet an entrepreneur in a given time interval if the ratio of venture capitalists to entrepreneurs
is low. It is convenient to assume that q(θ) is continuously diﬀerentiable. Since the mass of deals
per unit of time is MEq(θ), the arrival rate of a deal from the perspective of an entrepreneur
equals θq(θ), which is increasing in θ. Define qF (θ) := q(θ) and qE(θ) := θq(θ).
Example 3: Search Efficiency. Suppose the mass of deals per unit of time is given by
ξ[MEMF ]
0.5, where ξ > 0 represents an eﬃciency measure. For instance, ξ could be a measure
of market transparency: matching is easier if the market is more transparent, which, holding the
market size fixed, results in more deals per unit of time. Given this specification, arrival rates
are qE(θ) = ξθ0.5 and qF (θ) = ξθ−0.5, respectively. We will return to this matching technology
in Section 5.4 below.
If the search is successful, the venture capitalist and entrepreneur bargain over a contract.7
Reservation values derive from the standard asset value equations8
rUR = qE(θ)(U
B − UR), (10)
and
rV R = qF (θ)(V
B − V R). (11)
If the venture capitalist and entrepreneur reach an agreement, they leave the market.
Stationarity requires that the inflow of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs matches the
respective outflow. Denote the measure of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists arriving in the
market over one unit of time by mE and mF , respectively. The market is stationary if
qF (θ)MF = mF , (12)
7 The model can be extended (e.g., by introducing heterogeneity or match complementarities) such that on
average, a suitable partner is found only after several unsuccessful visits.
8 Outside options can be valued as assets. Consider the entrepreneur’s reservation value UR. The (Poisson)
arrival rate of a deal from the perspective of an entrepreneur is qE(θ). The probability that a deal occurs in the
next small time interval ∆ is thus qE(θ)∆. With probability 1 − qE(θ)∆ no deal occurs, and the entrepreneur
continues searching. The expected discounted utility from searching is therefore
UR = qE(θ)∆ exp (−r∆)UB + (1− qE(θ)∆) exp (−r∆)UR.
Solving for UR and letting ∆→ 0 using L’Hôpital’s rule, we have
UR =
qE(θ)U
B
qE(θ) + r
.
Rearranging terms yields (10). The intuition for (11) is analogous.
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